The Business Divorce Law Report

September 18, 2018

Action by Written Consent of LLC Managers is Valid to Fire Executive

Any action that the managers of a Limited Liability Company might take at a meeting can also be taken by executing a written consent.
An action by written consent may, in some circumstances, avoid the need to assemble a quorum of the managers.
The managers of an LLC many be contractually obligated to effect management changes by an operating agreement, but those obligations are not self-executing.

Limited Liability Company Lawyers A venture capital company and the independent manager of a limited liability company were permitted to correct a questionable vote and use a written consent to terminate one of the founders as manager of a group of holding companies.

The fired manager had challenged the vote as lacking a quorum, with only two of the four members present. The managers simply acted by written consent, permitted under Delaware Law, and the court held that the action had the necessary “disinterested” votes under the LLC’s operating agreement to remove the manager.

September 2, 2018

Business Divorce of Closely Held Corporations – An Overview

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

‘Business Divorce’ refers to disputes in which the owners of a closely held business, whether a corporation, limited liability company, partnership or limited partnership, must separate their business interests.
In many cases, such as oppressed minority shareholder cases or oppressed LLC member cases, there are allegations that those in control of the company have engaged in wrongful behavior. In other cases, the deadlock of the owners on an important issue is the source of the dispute.
Courts that hear business divorce cases have the ability to intervene and impose short-term relief, such as an injunction or appointment of a custodian, and a permanent remedy, including the sale of the business, the compelled purchase of an owner’s interest or even the dissolution and liquidation of the enterprise.

achievement-agreement-body-language-1179804-1024x600 No one gets married expecting to get divorced. And no one forms a business expecting that it will fall apart. Just as people get divorced, many businesses come to the point at which a business divorce is the best alternative because the partners cannot, or will not, continue to work together. When that happens, the parties need to restructure, and often separate, their business interests.

Business Divorce Defined

We use the term business divorce to describe a series of different types of lawsuits that involve the owners of a closely held business. The defining character of the business divorce is that co-owners of a business must separate their business interests. There are typically two alternatives. Either one or more of the owners exits the business as part of a sale, or the business itself will be sold. While much of the business divorce litigation in the courts today is in the form of an action for involuntary dissolution of the business, it is the rare case in which the business actually dissolves by settling its debts and selling its assets. There are far better alternatives. In this article, we focus on the closely held corporation. Some of the principles are similar with other types of businesses, which we address in other articles, but the application of the principles are often quite different.

The law varies from state to state and much of this discussion is general. To the extent that we discuss specific state laws that apply to business divorce, we focus on New York, New Jersey and Delaware law. Continue reading

August 27, 2018

LLC Member Denied Judicial Dissolution

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

New York does not recognize a cause of action for minority oppression of a member of a limited liability company.
Judicial dissolution is a remedy available to the minority LLC member when the majority is unwilling or unable to promote the purpose of the company or continuing the business has become financially not feasible.

The dismissal of a judicial dissolution claim brought by an LLC member seeking to dissolve the family business demonstrates the difficulty that an oppressed minority LLC member faces under New York law.

New York does not recognize a cause of action for minority oppression under its limited liability company statute, and so a trial judge in New York County made quick dismissal of a claim for involuntary judicial dissolution based on the allegations of a minority member that he was being treated unfairly. The plaintiff’s attorneys missed the mark and failed to assert other significant claims suggested by the facts alleged in the complaint.

August 20, 2018

Member-Managed Limited Liability Company Similar to Partnership

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

A trial court reasons that because a member-managed limited liability company is similar in management to a partnership, the court may reason from partnership law in fashioning a remedy for an expelled member.
The majority members of the LLC, who voted under the Operating Agreement, to compel the withdrawal of the member are jointly and severally liable to pay the ousted member the fair value of his equity interest.
When no other provision of the limited liability company statute applies, in many states a court may turn to recognized “rules of law and equity” to fashion a remedy.

Limited Liability Company Disputes Attorney A Delaware chancery judge drew a liberal comparison between a venture capital fund organized as a limited liability company and a limited partnership in holding that a member that had been forced out was entitled to fair value rather than the value of his capital account. The result was that his buyout increased by some fivefold, but not for the reasons advanced by the departing member.

Compelled Withdrawal of Member Requires Payment of Fair Value

The case, Domain Associates, LLC v. Shah, is significant for two principal holdings. First, it represents a relatively rare occurrence when a trial court falls back on the equitable catch-all provision that one finds in a number of limited liability company and partnership statutes. Second, the trial judge considered the management structure – the LLC at issue was member-managed similar to a partnership – as good reason to follow a decision construing the equitable catch-all provision found in Delaware’s partnership statute. Continue reading

August 10, 2018

Fair Value of a Corporation: Art not Science

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

In valuing the shares of a minority shareholder, a trial court must consider any valuation technique that is generally acceptable in the financial communities. Determining fair value is an art, not a science.
Directors that hold a majority interest in a closely held business have a duty to deal fairly with the minority and in a merger to make full and fair disclosures and offer a fair price in exchange for shares.
A minority shareholder that sits by or acquiesces to wrongful conduct by the majority waives the right to later pursue a claim based on that behavior.
Fee awards are available only to shareholders with a statutory right to dissent and in the discretion of the judge.

Casey v. Brennan, 344 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 2001)

Statues: NJSA 14A:11-1, NJSA 14A11-3; NJSA 14A:6-14: NJSA 14A:11-6; NJSA 14A:11-10

Action challenging the valuation provided by controlling directors (also majority shareholders) in corporate reorganization as plan to reduce number of shareholders to 75 or less to qualify for subchapter S status. Directors approved plan of merger at $73 a share in reorganization plan requiring small shareholders to sell. Trial Judge set value at $90 a share. (Opinion here.) The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division. (Opinion here.)

Facts: Community Bank adopted a plan of merger as part of a plan of reorganization that would reduce the number of shareholders by acquring holdings of persons with less than 15,000 sharesat a price of $73 per share. Statutory dissenters and non-statutory dissenters brought various actions consolidated for trial. Trial court holding that proxy statement was misleading and provided non-statutory dissenters with right to sue, and determined fair value $90 per share. Affirmed in part and remanded for reconsideration of valuation issues that were rejected by trial court. Continue reading

July 31, 2018

Single Business or Amalgamation Theory Applies to Related Businesses

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

The Single Business Theory permits a court to treat related businesses as though they were one enterprise.
Courts apply the single business theory in rare cases to prevent injustice.

Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 2018 S.C. LEXIS 85 (2018)

Cases-of-Note-Corporations-300x166 Statutes: S.C. Code Ann. § 33-18-420; S.C. Code Ann. § 33-15-105; S.C. Code Ann. § 33-18-200 to -210; S.C. Code Ann. § 33-18-220; S.C. Code Ann. § 33-18-230; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-14-31

An action by minority shareholder and manager of three restaurants, two organized in North and one in South Carolina, seeking valuation and purchase of interests as oppressed shareholder, and alleging that each of three closely held “s corporations” are a single business entity located in South Carolina. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court recognizes the amalgamation theory under which multiple enterprises may be treated as single entity, but reverses because plaintiff was not assigned the burden of proof and because a South Carolina court has no authority to consider the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. (Opinion here.) Continue reading

July 30, 2018

Minority Shareholder Lacks Standing to Sue for Dissolution

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

New York’s BCL requires at least 50 percent of shares to petition for dissolution based on deadlock, unless there has been a failure to elect directors.
The fact that a shareholders agreement required the election of two deadlocked directors was not a basis to waive the statutory requirement.
Parties avoid claims of wrongdoing and oppressed shareholder action that could trigger mandatory sale of minority interest.

Oppressed Shareholder lawsuit attorney

Judicial Dissolution Petition Requires 50 Percent Shareholder

A minority shareholder in New York will have a difficult time pursuing a claim for dissolution because of a deadlocked board of directors or a deadlock among the shareholders. New York law permits a cause of action for judicial dissolution based on deadlock, but only by shareholders with holdings of 50 percent or greater, unless the shareholders are unable to elect directors.

The statute can be harsh in its application, as demonstrated by a trial judge’s decision to dismiss a petition for dissolution under BCL § 1104, the provision of the New York Business Corporations Law that creates a statutory cause of action for judicial dissolution. (We discuss the issue of deadlock in more detail in our series on the topic, here and here.) Continue reading

July 23, 2018

Deadlock Resolved by Appointment of Custodian

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

Courts use their authority to appoint a custodian to take control of a closely held corporation as a remedy to deadlocked directors or shareholders.
A showing of serious or irreparable harm is required before a court will intervene in a deadlock among shareholders or directors; more than dissension is required.
A court may direct a custodian to dissolve and liquidate a corporation, or sell the entire business as a going concern, in the best interest of the shareholders and other constituencies like employees.

Appointing a custodian or receiver of a closely held corporation is a recognized remedy when the owners are deadlocked. Once appointed, the custodian or receiver may be given wide authority to break the deadlock, to manage, to sell or dissolve the corporation — including cases in which the remedy seems to go beyond what is provided in the statute.

A Series Examining Deadlock Among the Owners of Closely Held Corporations, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships

A bitter business divorce between two former college sweethearts provided the background for the Delaware Supreme Court’s analysis of the circumstances in which it could provide a dissolution-like remedy and order the sale of a large successful business.

INTERVIEW

The decision of the Delaware Chancery Court, Shawe v. Elting, involved Transperfect Global, Inc., a corporation formed by Elizabeth Elting and Philip Shawe in 1992 while the pair lived together in a New York University dorm room. The two became the co-CEOs, sole directors and equal owners of a company that provided a variety of translation services from locations around the globe, generating $80 million in profits in 2014. (Shaw later transferred 1 percent to his mother, but she remained firmly in his camp, which caused the deadlock to continue.) Continue reading

July 11, 2018

Shareholder Oppression is Frustration of Minority Shareholder’s Reasonable Expectations

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

This seminal case by the New Jersey Supreme Court identifies minority oppression as the frustration of a shareholder’s reasonable expectations.
A court may order the compelled purchase of a shareholder’s interest as a remedy for shareholder oppression when it is the only practical alternative to judicial dissolution.
The minority shareholder seeking to force the purchase of shares must show a connection between the oppressive conduct of the majority and the minority’s interest as a shareholder.

Brenner v. Berkowitz, 134 NJ 488 (1993)

Cases-of-Note-Corporations-300x166

Statutes: N.J.S.A. 14A:12-7(1)(c)

Facts: Partners Resnick and Berkowitz formed successful company. Members of both families were employed in the business. When Resnick died, his shares were distributed to family members, including his daughter, the plaintiff Brenner. Relations between the two family members soured and Brenner’s son was fired. Brenner alleged illegal and oppressive conduct.

Trial court found that Brenner’s expectation was solely as director and investor, not in management of business affairs. Trial court found that some conduct of majority was illegal, but that it was not directed to plaintiff. The oppression was insufficient to trigger the statute. Continue reading

July 9, 2018

Deadlock Requires Finding of Harm to Corporation

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

Deadlock is more than an inability to make a decision. It is an inability to act under circumstances that present the real threat of harm to the business.
Deadlock is triggered by the shareholders’ inability to elect directors.
When there are no alternatives to prevent harm to the business, like a buy-sell agreement, a Court is likely to find that the shareholders or directors are deadlocked.

For the closely held corporation, deadlock may be the result of a dispute among the shareholders, or among the directors in circumstances that the shareholders cannot fix by electing new directors. Whether a court is asked to find deadlock under an applicable corporations statute or as part of a common-law remedy, deadlock is rarely found in circumstances in which there is no threat of significant or irreparable harm.

In this article, we will consider some of the circumstance in which courts have been asked to declare that a deadlock exists among the directors and/or shareholders of a corporation – often in a closely held corporation they are one and the same – and to fashion a remedy. Most often the principal remedy in the INTERVIEW case of a “true deadlock” is the dissolution of the corporation, which entails the liquidation of the entity. Courts rarely impose such an extreme remedy on a viable business entity, so such remedies as the sale of a minority interest, sale of the entity as a going concern or other types of injunctive relief are far more common.

A Series Examining Deadlock Among the Owners of Closely Held Corporations, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships

Corporations statues vary in the statutory remedy for deadlock or oppression. The Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA), on which many state corporations codes are modeled, provides for the judicial dissolution of a corporation when the shareholders are unable to elect directors or when the directors are deadlocked in the management of corporate affairs; the shareholders cannot break the deadlock; and there is either the potential for irreparable harm to the corporation, or the “business and affairs of the corporation” cannot be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders. MCBA § 14.30. The model act also provides a court with broad powers to appoint a custodian to manage and/or wind up the affairs of the corporation. MCBA §§ 7.48; 14.32. Continue reading

Any action that the managers of a Limited Liability Company might take at a meeting can also be taken by executing a written consent.

An action by written consent may, in some circumstances, avoid the need to assemble a quorum of the managers.

The managers of an LLC many be contractually obligated to effect management changes by an operating agreement, but those obligations are not self-executing.

‘Business Divorce’ refers to disputes in which the owners of a closely held business, whether a corporation, limited liability company, partnership or limited partnership, must separate their business interests.

In many cases, such as oppressed minority shareholder cases or oppressed LLC member cases, there are allegations that those in control of the company have engaged in wrongful behavior. In other cases, the deadlock of the owners on an important issue is the source of the dispute.

Business Divorce Defined

New York does not recognize a cause of action for minority oppression of a member of a limited liability company.

Judicial dissolution is a remedy available to the minority LLC member when the majority is unwilling or unable to promote the purpose of the company or continuing the business has become financially not feasible.

A trial court reasons that because a member-managed limited liability company is similar in management to a partnership, the court may reason from partnership law in fashioning a remedy for an expelled member.

The majority members of the LLC, who voted under the Operating Agreement, to compel the withdrawal of the member are jointly and severally liable to pay the ousted member the fair value of his equity interest.

When no other provision of the limited liability company statute applies, in many states a court may turn to recognized “rules of law and equity” to fashion a remedy.

Compelled Withdrawal of Member Requires Payment of Fair Value

In valuing the shares of a minority shareholder, a trial court must consider any valuation technique that is generally acceptable in the financial communities. Determining fair value is an art, not a science.

Directors that hold a majority interest in a closely held business have a duty to deal fairly with the minority and in a merger to make full and fair disclosures and offer a fair price in exchange for shares.

A minority shareholder that sits by or acquiesces to wrongful conduct by the majority waives the right to later pursue a claim based on that behavior.

Fee awards are available only to shareholders with a statutory right to dissent and in the discretion of the judge.

Casey v. Brennan, 344 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 2001)

The Single Business Theory permits a court to treat related businesses as though they were one enterprise.

Courts apply the single business theory in rare cases to prevent injustice.

Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 2018 S.C. LEXIS 85 (2018)

New York’s BCL requires at least 50 percent of shares to petition for dissolution based on deadlock, unless there has been a failure to elect directors.

The fact that a shareholders agreement required the election of two deadlocked directors was not a basis to waive the statutory requirement.

Parties avoid claims of wrongdoing and oppressed shareholder action that could trigger mandatory sale of minority interest.

Judicial Dissolution Petition Requires 50 Percent Shareholder

A Series Examining Deadlock Among the Owners of Closely Held Corporations, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships

This seminal case by the New Jersey Supreme Court identifies minority oppression as the frustration of a shareholder’s reasonable expectations.

A court may order the compelled purchase of a shareholder’s interest as a remedy for shareholder oppression when it is the only practical alternative to judicial dissolution.

The minority shareholder seeking to force the purchase of shares must show a connection between the oppressive conduct of the majority and the minority’s interest as a shareholder.

Brenner v. Berkowitz, 134 NJ 488 (1993)

A Series Examining Deadlock Among the Owners of Closely Held Corporations, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships