The Business Divorce Law Report

August 20, 2018

Member-Managed Limited Liability Company Similar to Partnership

A trial court reasons that because a member-managed limited liability company is similar in management to a partnership, the court may reason from partnership law in fashioning a remedy for an expelled member.
The majority members of the LLC, who voted under the Operating Agreement, to compel the withdrawal of the member are jointly and severally liable to pay the ousted member the fair value of his equity interest.
When no other provision of the limited liability company statute applies, in many states a court may turn to recognized “rules of law and equity” to fashion a remedy.

Limited Liability Company Disputes Attorney A Delaware chancery judge drew a liberal comparison between a venture capital fund organized as a limited liability company and a limited partnership in holding that a member that had been forced out was entitled to fair value rather than the value of his capital account. The result was that his buyout increased by some fivefold, but not for the reasons advanced by the departing member.

Compelled Withdrawal of Member Requires Payment of Fair Value

The case, Domain Associates, LLC v. Shah, is significant for two principal holdings. First, it represents a relatively rare occurrence when a trial court falls back on the equitable catch-all provision that one finds in a number of limited liability company and partnership statutes. Second, the trial judge considered the management structure – the LLC at issue was member-managed similar to a partnership – as good reason to follow a decision construing the equitable catch-all provision found in Delaware’s partnership statute. Continue reading

August 10, 2018

Fair Value of a Corporation: Art not Science

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

In valuing the shares of a minority shareholder, a trial court must consider any valuation technique that is generally acceptable in the financial communities. Determining fair value is an art, not a science.
Directors that hold a majority interest in a closely held business have a duty to deal fairly with the minority and in a merger to make full and fair disclosures and offer a fair price in exchange for shares.
A minority shareholder that sits by or acquiesces to wrongful conduct by the majority waives the right to later pursue a claim based on that behavior.
Fee awards are available only to shareholders with a statutory right to dissent and in the discretion of the judge.

Casey v. Brennan, 344 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 2001)

Statutes: NJSA 14A:11-1, NJSA 14A11-3; NJSA 14A:6-14: NJSA 14A:11-6; NJSA 14A:11-10

Action challenging the valuation provided by controlling directors (also majority shareholders) in corporate reorganization as plan to reduce number of shareholders to 75 or less to qualify for subchapter S status. Directors approved plan of merger at $73 a share in reorganization plan requiring small shareholders to sell. Trial Judge set value at $90 a share. (Opinion here.) The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division. (Opinion here.)

Facts: Community Bank adopted a plan of merger as part of a plan of reorganization that would reduce the number of shareholders by acquring holdings of persons with less than 15,000 sharesat a price of $73 per share. Statutory dissenters and non-statutory dissenters brought various actions consolidated for trial. Trial court holding that proxy statement was misleading and provided non-statutory dissenters with right to sue, and determined fair value $90 per share. Affirmed in part and remanded for reconsideration of valuation issues that were rejected by trial court. Continue reading

July 31, 2018

Single Business or Amalgamation Theory Applies to Related Businesses

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

The Single Business Theory permits a court to treat related businesses as though they were one enterprise.
Courts apply the single business theory in rare cases to prevent injustice.

Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 2018 S.C. LEXIS 85 (2018)

Cases-of-Note-Corporations-300x166 Statutes: S.C. Code Ann. § 33-18-420; S.C. Code Ann. § 33-15-105; S.C. Code Ann. § 33-18-200 to -210; S.C. Code Ann. § 33-18-220; S.C. Code Ann. § 33-18-230; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-14-31

An action by minority shareholder and manager of three restaurants, two organized in North and one in South Carolina, seeking valuation and purchase of interests as oppressed shareholder, and alleging that each of three closely held “s corporations” are a single business entity located in South Carolina. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court recognizes the amalgamation theory under which multiple enterprises may be treated as single entity, but reverses because plaintiff was not assigned the burden of proof and because a South Carolina court has no authority to consider the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. (Opinion here.) Continue reading

July 30, 2018

Minority Shareholder Lacks Standing to Sue for Dissolution

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

New York’s BCL requires at least 50 percent of shares to petition for dissolution based on deadlock, unless there has been a failure to elect directors.
The fact that a shareholders agreement required the election of two deadlocked directors was not a basis to waive the statutory requirement.
Parties avoid claims of wrongdoing and oppressed shareholder action that could trigger mandatory sale of minority interest.

Oppressed Shareholder lawsuit attorney

Judicial Dissolution Petition Requires 50 Percent Shareholder

A minority shareholder in New York will have a difficult time pursuing a claim for dissolution because of a deadlocked board of directors or a deadlock among the shareholders. New York law permits a cause of action for judicial dissolution based on deadlock, but only by shareholders with holdings of 50 percent or greater, unless the shareholders are unable to elect directors.

The statute can be harsh in its application, as demonstrated by a trial judge’s decision to dismiss a petition for dissolution under BCL § 1104, the provision of the New York Business Corporations Law that creates a statutory cause of action for judicial dissolution. (We discuss the issue of deadlock in more detail in our series on the topic, here and here.) Continue reading

July 23, 2018

Deadlock Resolved by Appointment of Custodian

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

Courts use their authority to appoint a custodian to take control of a closely held corporation as a remedy to deadlocked directors or shareholders.
A showing of serious or irreparable harm is required before a court will intervene in a deadlock among shareholders or directors; more than dissension is required.
A court may direct a custodian to dissolve and liquidate a corporation, or sell the entire business as a going concern, in the best interest of the shareholders and other constituencies like employees.

Appointing a custodian or receiver of a closely held corporation is a recognized remedy when the owners are deadlocked. Once appointed, the custodian or receiver may be given wide authority to break the deadlock, to manage, to sell or dissolve the corporation — including cases in which the remedy seems to go beyond what is provided in the statute.

A Series Examining Deadlock Among the Owners of Closely Held Corporations, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships

A bitter business divorce between two former college sweethearts provided the background for the Delaware Supreme Court’s analysis of the circumstances in which it could provide a dissolution-like remedy and order the sale of a large successful business.

INTERVIEW

The decision of the Delaware Chancery Court, Shawe v. Elting, involved Transperfect Global, Inc., a corporation formed by Elizabeth Elting and Philip Shawe in 1992 while the pair lived together in a New York University dorm room. The two became the co-CEOs, sole directors and equal owners of a company that provided a variety of translation services from locations around the globe, generating $80 million in profits in 2014. (Shaw later transferred 1 percent to his mother, but she remained firmly in his camp, which caused the deadlock to continue.) Continue reading

July 11, 2018

Shareholder Oppression is Frustration of Minority Shareholder’s Reasonable Expectations

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

This seminal case by the New Jersey Supreme Court identifies minority oppression as the frustration of a shareholder’s reasonable expectations.
A court may order the compelled purchase of a shareholder’s interest as a remedy for shareholder oppression when it is the only practical alternative to judicial dissolution.
The minority shareholder seeking to force the purchase of shares must show a connection between the oppressive conduct of the majority and the minority’s interest as a shareholder.

Brenner v. Berkowitz, 134 NJ 488 (1993)

Cases-of-Note-Corporations-300x166

Statutes: N.J.S.A. 14A:12-7(1)(c)

Facts: Partners Resnick and Berkowitz formed successful company. Members of both families were employed in the business. When Resnick died, his shares were distributed to family members, including his daughter, the plaintiff Brenner. Relations between the two family members soured and Brenner’s son was fired. Brenner alleged illegal and oppressive conduct.

Trial court found that Brenner’s expectation was solely as director and investor, not in management of business affairs. Trial court found that some conduct of majority was illegal, but that it was not directed to plaintiff. The oppression was insufficient to trigger the statute. Continue reading

July 9, 2018

Deadlock Requires Finding of Harm to Corporation

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

Deadlock is more than an inability to make a decision. It is an inability to act under circumstances that present the real threat of harm to the business.
Deadlock is triggered by the shareholders’ inability to elect directors.
When there are no alternatives to prevent harm to the business, like a buy-sell agreement, a Court is likely to find that the shareholders or directors are deadlocked.

For the closely held corporation, deadlock may be the result of a dispute among the shareholders, or among the directors in circumstances that the shareholders cannot fix by electing new directors. Whether a court is asked to find deadlock under an applicable corporations statute or as part of a common-law remedy, deadlock is rarely found in circumstances in which there is no threat of significant or irreparable harm.

In this article, we will consider some of the circumstance in which courts have been asked to declare that a deadlock exists among the directors and/or shareholders of a corporation – often in a closely held corporation they are one and the same – and to fashion a remedy. Most often the principal remedy in the INTERVIEW case of a “true deadlock” is the dissolution of the corporation, which entails the liquidation of the entity. Courts rarely impose such an extreme remedy on a viable business entity, so such remedies as the sale of a minority interest, sale of the entity as a going concern or other types of injunctive relief are far more common.

A Series Examining Deadlock Among the Owners of Closely Held Corporations, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships

Corporations statues vary in the statutory remedy for deadlock or oppression. The Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA), on which many state corporations codes are modeled, provides for the judicial dissolution of a corporation when the shareholders are unable to elect directors or when the directors are deadlocked in the management of corporate affairs; the shareholders cannot break the deadlock; and there is either the potential for irreparable harm to the corporation, or the “business and affairs of the corporation” cannot be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders. MCBA § 14.30. The model act also provides a court with broad powers to appoint a custodian to manage and/or wind up the affairs of the corporation. MCBA §§ 7.48; 14.32. Continue reading

July 2, 2018

Deadlock in the Closely Held Business

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

Deadlock is the inability of the owners of a business to make critical decisions, a paralysis of the management of closely held corporation, limited liability company or partnership.
The inability to maintain normal operations is a characteristic of a deadlocked business.
Courts will intervene to prevent harm to a deadlocked corporation, LLC or partnership, typically when one of the owners petitions to dissolve the business.

Deadlock occurs when the owners of a closely held business, be it a close corporation, partnership or limited liability company, are unable to reach a decision on some matter involving the business. Because deadlock is typically associated with businesses in which most or all of the owners participate directly in management, they are characterized by emotions, self-interest and not always rational.

A Series Examining Deadlock Among the Owners of Closely Held Corporations, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships

In the simplest case, two 50/50 owners are unable to come to some decision that is critical to the business, for example whether to provide additional capital or give personal guarantees to a lender. Because the ownership is equally shared, the principals have to govern by consensus, or not at all. This is true whether it is a corporation, limited liability company or partnership. Continue reading

September 13, 2017

Failure to Object to Business Practices Waives Minority Shareholder Rights

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

Cases-of-Note-Corporations

Digital Camera International, Ltd. v. Antebi, et al., 11-cv-1823 (E.D.N,.Y. July 13, 2017)

Statutes: N.J.S.A. 14A:12-7(1)(c)

Facts:Shareholders of a New Jersey corporation participated in a variety of activities that would be classified as oppressive behavior, including the payment of persona expenses with corporate funds, operating a competing business, insider contracts at inflated prices and corporate payments of personal tax liabilities

September 13, 2017

Unanimous Consent Signed by LLC Members Operates as Amendment to Operating Agreement

by Jay R. McDaniel, Esq.

Cases-of-Note-Corporations-1-300x169

Clark v. Butoku Karate Sch., LLC, No. 326638 (Mich. App., 2016)

Statutes: MCL 450.4101, MCL 450.4305, MCL 450.4509

Plaintiff Joby Clark and Defendant were the sole members of a Michigan Limited Liability Company operating a karate school. Clark was the subject of a rumor that he had a sexual relationship with an underage student. The parties agreed that Clark would leave the business to prevent damage to the school.

A trial court reasons that because a member-managed limited liability company is similar in management to a partnership, the court may reason from partnership law in fashioning a remedy for an expelled member.

The majority members of the LLC, who voted under the Operating Agreement, to compel the withdrawal of the member are jointly and severally liable to pay the ousted member the fair value of his equity interest.

When no other provision of the limited liability company statute applies, in many states a court may turn to recognized “rules of law and equity” to fashion a remedy.

Compelled Withdrawal of Member Requires Payment of Fair Value

In valuing the shares of a minority shareholder, a trial court must consider any valuation technique that is generally acceptable in the financial communities. Determining fair value is an art, not a science.

Directors that hold a majority interest in a closely held business have a duty to deal fairly with the minority and in a merger to make full and fair disclosures and offer a fair price in exchange for shares.

A minority shareholder that sits by or acquiesces to wrongful conduct by the majority waives the right to later pursue a claim based on that behavior.

Fee awards are available only to shareholders with a statutory right to dissent and in the discretion of the judge.

Casey v. Brennan, 344 N.J. Super. 83 (App. Div. 2001)

The Single Business Theory permits a court to treat related businesses as though they were one enterprise.

Courts apply the single business theory in rare cases to prevent injustice.

Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 2018 S.C. LEXIS 85 (2018)

New York’s BCL requires at least 50 percent of shares to petition for dissolution based on deadlock, unless there has been a failure to elect directors.

The fact that a shareholders agreement required the election of two deadlocked directors was not a basis to waive the statutory requirement.

Parties avoid claims of wrongdoing and oppressed shareholder action that could trigger mandatory sale of minority interest.

Judicial Dissolution Petition Requires 50 Percent Shareholder

A Series Examining Deadlock Among the Owners of Closely Held Corporations, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships

This seminal case by the New Jersey Supreme Court identifies minority oppression as the frustration of a shareholder’s reasonable expectations.

A court may order the compelled purchase of a shareholder’s interest as a remedy for shareholder oppression when it is the only practical alternative to judicial dissolution.

The minority shareholder seeking to force the purchase of shares must show a connection between the oppressive conduct of the majority and the minority’s interest as a shareholder.

Brenner v. Berkowitz, 134 NJ 488 (1993)

A Series Examining Deadlock Among the Owners of Closely Held Corporations, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships

The inability to maintain normal operations is a characteristic of a deadlocked business.

Courts will intervene to prevent harm to a deadlocked corporation, LLC or partnership, typically when one of the owners petitions to dissolve the business.

A Series Examining Deadlock Among the Owners of Closely Held Corporations, Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships

Digital Camera International, Ltd. v. Antebi, et al., 11-cv-1823 (E.D.N,.Y. July 13, 2017)

Clark v. Butoku Karate Sch., LLC, No. 326638 (Mich. App., 2016)